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Abstract 
This article makes use of a unique personnel data set to explore job separation behavior among 
workers who qualify for the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC).  Results indicate that the 
employment of WOTC workers is no less stable overall than that of similar non-WOTC workers.  
The tenures of the two groups differ when calculated within sets of reasons for separation.  
Evidence tends to suggest that the availability of a variety of job assistance programs might be 
useful in increasing workers' tenure in jobs. 
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 In the 1990s, a rash of U.S. policy initiatives attempted to provide a more efficient 
and effective safety net for the poor.  The efforts were centered primarily around the 
goals of eliminating welfare guarantees, facilitating efforts of clients to find a job, and 
rewarding such efforts.  The most famous of these initiatives is the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA); U.S. 
Public Law 104-193), which replaces the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) program with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program.  
New rules under the TANF program impose strict time limits on benefits and require 
recipients to work as a condition of benefit receipt.  The problems with and success of 
this reform have been widely investigated in the literature (for a good synthesis, see 
Blank 2002). 
 In addition to the punishment-oriented approach of PRWORA, there were several 
reward-based initiatives. The latter initiatives provide incentives for desirable behavior.  
Incentives are targeted either to the individual, or to the employer, such as the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC), which was expanded considerably in 1994, or to the 
employer, such as in the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC) and the Welfare-to-
Work Tax Credit (WtWTC), enacted in 1996, but allowed to lapse as of December 31, 
2005.1  Another type of initiative focuses on human capital development through training 
programs.  An example of this type of policy initiative is the Job Training Partnership Act 
(JTPA;U.S. Public Law 97-300 [1982]), which began in 1983 and was superseded by the 
                                                
1 See Hotz and Scholz (2001) for a history of and detailed description of the EITC, and 
Katz (1998) for a broad discussion of targeted wage subsidies. 
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Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA; U.S. Public Law 105-220).   
 This article investigates the behavior of workers whose employment enables their 
employers to receive incentives through the WOTC.  It joins a large literature in 
considering how subsidies to employers affect the behavior of employers and workers.  
The article makes a unique contribution by comparing the behavior of workers qualifying 
for the program under consideration with the behavior of similarly skilled, nonqualifying, 
workers in the same employment environment.  If there is no comparable control group 
against which WOTC worker behavior can be evaluated, outcomes associated with 
WOTC workers may, in fact, be more appropriately attributed to their characteristics than 
to the effects of the subsidized status. This article works to distinguish which outcomes, if 
any, are truly associated with receiving the credit. 
 The WOTC program was authorized by the Small Business Job Protection Act of 
1996, (U.S. Public Law 104-188).  When in operation, it provided a tax credit to 
employers for hiring workers from eight possible target groups, described later in the 
article (see U.S. Department of Labor 2006).2  WOTC followed on the heels of  the 
Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC), which expired in 1994.  In 1979, the TJTC replaced the 
New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC), which had been in existence since 1977.  The earliest 
research on the employment outcomes of wage subsidy programs typically finds that 
subsidies have positive effects, and those efforts persist across subsidy amounts (see, e.g., 
Perloff and Wachter 1979; Bishop 1981).3 However, other works indicate that subsidies 
have a "stigmatizing" effect (Burtless 1985, 113), identifying individuals as problem 
                                                
2 The specific target groups and program details can be found online at “Work 
Opportunity Tax Credit, “http://www.doleta.gov/business/Incentives/opptax/ (accessed 
11 August 2006.) 
3 Also see Katz (1998) for a thorough summary of research up to that date and some 
further evidence of modest employment gains as the result of wage subsidies. 
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workers if they belong to a group that qualifies for the subsidy. Employers appear to 
assume that the subsidy received from hiring these workers does not outweigh the 
expected increases in such costs as absenteeism, and low productivity (see, e.g., Burtless 
1985; Hollenbeck and Willke 1991).   
 Research finds that the effects of the WOTC and WtWTC programs are mostly 
consistent with those documented under earlier programs.  Specifically, Sarah Hamersma 
(2003, 2005) finds moderately positive employment outcomes among subsidized 
workers, but also finds that the total effect is quite limited, and asserts that this is 
primarily due to the low participation rate of eligible workers.  In addition, studies by 
Hamersma (2005), and Hamersma and Carolyn Heinrich (2005), document only short-
term wage advantages among WOTC and WtWTC workers.  Although the WOTC and 
WtWTC programs were allowed to lapse as of December 2005, ongoing analysis of the 
effects of these programs is useful in understanding the benefits on an approach toward 
helping groups of workers who struggle in securing and maintaining employment. 
 This article sets out to investigate the validity of the potential employer perception 
that WOTC and WtWTC workers are less than other employees.  In particular, it is 
concerned with whether workers who qualify for the WOTC subsidy (hereafter described 
as WOTC workers) demonstrate significantly different job separation patterns than 
workers who are hired by the same employer but do not qualify for the WOTC subsidy 
(hereafter described as non-WOTC workers).  The lack of information about the 
applicant hiring pool means that all results reported here work with a sample consisting 
of WOTC workers who actually have jobs. This should understate any differences 
identified between non-WOTC workers and the random WOTC qualifying worker.  In 
other words, the WOTC workers in this study survived the firm's screening process for 
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new employees and thus are likely to be higher quality (more stable and reliable) 
employees than the typical WOTC  worker drawn at random.  Further, the current study 
examines only one employer, albeit a large one. 
 If one reason why wage subsidy programs have only minimal documented effects 
on employment is that employers' avoid the programs or stigmatize participants due to 
stereotypes concerning fears of unreliable workers, outcomes should improve if 
employers are presented with evidence that the stereotypes are unfounded.   
Current knowledge of unreliability (that is, of job separation behavior) among 
WOTC workers is limited to analyses based on studies about the job separation behavior 
of former welfare recipients.  There indeed is some overlap between workers qualifying 
for WOTC and workers identified as former welfare recipients, and this overlap persists, 
across years. Thirty to 60 percent of workers qualifying for WOTC do so (see the 
breakdown below).  The studies of welfare recipients are thus somewhat relevant. 
Research typically finds high turnover and poor job performance among a significant 
fraction of former welfare recipients (see, e.g. Holzer, Stoll, and Wissaker 2004, Johnson 
and Corcoran 2003; Berg, Olson, and Conrad 1992). Such findings may partially explain 
firms' potential reluctance to hire anyone whose involvement in (or qualifications for) a 
wage subsidy program might identify them as unreliable.  The question that remains, 
however, is whether the turnover and job performance behavior of WOTC workers 
actually differs from that of similar non-WOTC workers.  If similar behavior is 
identified, then employers' fears of hiring WOTC-qualifying workers (or, at least, those 
WOTC workers deemed worthy of employment) are unfounded. One implication would 
be that efforts to improve turnover and performance among all low-skilled workers may 
more effectively improve employment outcomes among the hard-to-place, than the 
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strategy of avoiding workers from programs like WOTC. 
 Unique Data 
 The data used in this study are from the personnel records of a large, unionized 
firm in the transportation industry. That firm has numerous domestic and international 
locations. Since the wage subsidy program being analyzed applies only to wages paid in 
(?) the United States, the study sample includes only domestic workers.  There is great 
variation in the types of jobs offered by this firm. The current study focuses on part-time 
package handlers (i.e., handlers of deliveries and shipments).  This is the job held by 
most of the firm’s WOTC workers.   Part-time package handlers typically work for 4 to 5 
hours a day, 5 days a week.  By focusing on one job type, this study ensures that working 
conditions are homogeneous for all members of the sample.  This homogeneity in job 
type is important because the study lacks information on sample members’ previous work 
experience.4  Analyses presume that individuals qualifying for this entry-level job have 
homogeneous (very limited) work experience, across WOTC status.  The job in question 
often involves heavy lifting, repetitive tasks (?), and working in extreme temperatures.  
Because this job requires a relatively low level of skill, it is the sort of position that a 
welfare recipient would be able to obtain, if that recipient can meet the physical 
requirements, which presumably do rule out some individuals (Wolman 1996; Zill et al. 
1991).  As will be discussed below, the pay and benefits available to these workers likely 
exceed those enjoyed by other workers transitioning from welfare to work. 
 The data set was constructed by querying the firm’s personnel records for all part-
time package handlers hired from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 1999. The records for 
                                                
4 The results in this article have nothing to say about the quality of a worker’s job 
separation outcome (other than reason of separation) or about how separation behavior 
differs between skilled and unskilled workers. 
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these employees were then matched with other personnel tables to obtain data on 
demographic (e.g., level of education and age), and job-related characteristics (e.g., shift 
worked).  To be classified by the firm as a WOTC worker, the individual must meet the 
criteria for one of eight targeted groups (percent of all U.S. WOTC-qualifying workers 
between 1997 and 2005 are in parentheses): 5  
(1) member of a family receiving AFDC over a specific time period (42 percent),  
(2) veteran and member of a family receiving food stamps (2 percent),  
(3) 18-24 year old member of a family receiving food stamps (28 percent),  
(4) high-risk youth (9 percent),  
(5) high-risk summer youth (1 percent),  
(6) ex-felon and economically disadvantaged (6 percent),  
(7) recipient of vocational rehabilitation assistance (5 percent), or  
(8) Supplelmental Security Income SSI recipient (6 percent). 
 
 There is no way to tell whether a non-WOTC worker falls into one of these 
targeted groups; regardless of the individual’s qualifications, the firm did not identify that 
person as a WOTC worker.  If the non-WOTC worker sample is contaminated with 
individuals who were WOTC eligible but not identified as such, it is likely that the large 
numbers of workers who truly do not qualify as WOTC workers would dilute any related 
estimation bias.6  In addition, because this firm had an active welfare-to-work hiring 
program, it is possible that there is little relevance in the usual concerns about the effect 
of employment subsidy programs on employer behavior (e.g., see Tannenwald 1982).  
Further, in order to not confound potential WOTC effects with state-specific effects, 
                                                
5 Statistical breakdown of qualifying WOTC workers was obtained from the Office of 
Performance Results, U.S. Department of Labor Employment and Training 
Administration (202-693-2786).   
6 We have a very limited ability to compare firm-identified WOTC status with recent 
receipt of welfare for a sub-sample of workers from the state of Georgia.  Of all workers 
in Georgia classified as non-WOTC workers, four percent were part of a welfare family.  
Comparing sample means across WOTC hires, non-WOTC workers, and non-WOTC 
workers who received welfare. Findings suggest that systematic differences in behavior 
identified between WOTC and non-WOTC designation are likely truly differences across 
WOTC qualification, rather than across WOTC participation. 
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analyses eliminate observations from states that have fewer than 20 WOTC workers.7 
 Summary Statistics 
 Table 1 describes the variables.  Table 2 provides sample means (of selected 
variables) by type of hire and censoring status.  The second table suggests that the 
percentage separating in the examined period is 4 percentage points higher for non-
WOTC workers than for WOTC workers (61 percent vs. 58 percent).  A form of the 
dependent variable in the duration model, tenure, indicates that the overall average tenure 
is longer for WOTC workers (116 days) than it is for non-WOTC workers (113 days).  
Sixty-six percent of WOTC workers and 68 percent of non-WOTC workers have tenure 
below the mean tenure reported for their WOTC status category.)  
The average age of the WOTC workers (24), is 1 year younger than the average 
age of the non-WOTC workers.  The average education level is similar for the two 
groups; the groups differ by less than 1 year. The average hourly wage rate is almost 
identical for the two groups. This is to be expected because this firm’s part-time package 
handlers belong to a union and because both groups have similar tenure.  The percentage 
of female employees is higher among WOTC workers (46 percent) than among non-
WOTC workers (19 percent).  The percentage of black employees is also higher. These 
differences raise the possibility that the behavior of the WOTC and non-WOTC samples 
will not be comparable because of unobserved differences related to race and gender.  
The reliability of the comparison group was tested by reestimating the models on 
subsamples of females only and blacks only.  The results are unchanged. 
[Tables 1 and 2 here] 
                                                
7 Twenty-three states remain represented in the data; these are AR, CA, CO, FL, GA, IL, 
IN, KY, MA, MD, MI, MO, NC, NE, NJ, NY, OH, OR, PA, SC, TN UT, VA. 
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 In the WOTC worker sample, 42 percent of the observations are censored (i.e., 
they did not separate prior to December 31, 1999); 39 percent of the non-WOTC 
observations are censored. Those workers whose observations are not censored have 
relatively the same tenure:  47 days for non-WOTC workers and 46 days for WOTC 
workers.  For censored observations, non-WOTC workers have a slightly longer tenure 
(218 days) than their WOTC counterparts (212 days).  The other variables remain 
relatively stable across censoring status within a given WOTC status category.  Figure 1 
provides an initial glimpse into possible differences in time-to-separation between 
WOTC and non-WOTC workers.  The figure illustrates that the bulk of all separations 
occur early, that non-WOTC workers appear to be more highly concentrated among the 
earliest (1 to 15 days) and latest (50 to 90 days) separations, and that WOTC workers are 
most concentrated among separations between 15 and 50 days. 
[Figure 1 here] 
 Representative Low-Skill Employment 
 Existing data from other studies help to further elucidate the nature of the sample.  
The position in question involves repetitive and physically demanding working 
conditions and hours of work.  Studies suggest that the job held by workers in this 
analysis appears to be comparable to those held by other subsidy-qualifying workers 
(Wolman 1996; Zill et al. 1991).  However, the wages and benefits, of this study’s 
workers are high, compared to those of workers in other studies.  Welfare recipients who 
transition into the workforce are likely to find jobs that typically pay between 7 and 8 
dollars an hour (1999 dollars; Loprest 2001, Parrott 1998; Grogger 2005; Hamersma and 
Heinrich 2005; and Johnson and Corcoran 2003) compared to ___ dollars here.  All 
employees of this firm are offered health insurance, paid vacations, paid (?) holidays, and 
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access to a 401(k) plan.  Sharon Parrott (1998) and Rucker Johnson and Mary Corcoran 
(2003) find that between 37 and 61 percent of welfare-to-work employees are in jobs that 
offer health benefits.  
 The implication of these differences is that the behavior observed among WOTC- 
qualifying workers in the current sample may differ from WOTC-qualifying workers 
elsewhere.  However, comparing the behavior of WOTC and non-WOTC workers in this 
firm may still identify valid differences that appear in other employment environments. 
 Job Separation Type 
 When an employee voluntarily or involuntarily separates from a job at this 
company, the individual’s main reason for separating was recorded.8  The firm’s process 
recognizes 53 different categories for tracking causes of separation.  This work distills 
those into four main categories for analysis:   professional reasons, personal issues, fired 
for cause, and no-show (absenteeism i.e., failure to show up for work).9  Employees who 
reportedly separated for professional reasons identified themselves, for example, as 
quitting to accept another job or because they were dissatisfied with a particular aspect of 
the job, such as pay, type of work, or hours.  Employees who reportedly separated for 
personal issues cited reasons such as health problems, a return to school, or transportation 
difficulties.  Separation due to being fired for cause reflects terminations that resulted 
after violation of company policies.  The firm’s records indicate that excessive 
absenteeism was the main reason employees were fired for cause (68 percent of all such 
terminations were attributed to excessive absenteeism).  A termination resulting from 
                                                
8 If the individual gave advance notice of the separation, the firm conducted an exit 
interview, recording the reason for leaving.  If the person merely stopped showing up for 
work, the firm listed "failed to report to work," as the reason for separation. 
9 Individuals who were laid off were not included in the analysis. 
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failure to show up for work (no-show) could arguably be categorized as a separation due 
to personal issues or as fired for cause.  Because a sizable proportion of the firm’s 
separations is due to an employee’s failure to show up for work, analyses classify no-
show terminations as a separate category. 
 Table 3 reports reasons for job separation by WOTC status.  Among both groups, 
personal issues are reported as the primary reasons for job separation. The percentage of 
separations due to personal issues is relatively the same for both groups: 35-36 percent.  
Professional issues are cited as the next most common cause of job separation.  Thirty-
two percent of separated non-WOTC workers attributed their separation to professional 
reasons.  The percentage was smaller among separated WOTC workers, who cited 
professional reasons as the impetus for 24 percent of separations. Among WOTC 
workers, no-show, at 23 percent, was also a frequently reported reason of separation.  
Among non-WOTC workers, no-show accounts for 21 percent of separations.  The 
percentage of separated WOTC workers who are fired for cause (18 percent) is larger 
than that of separated non-WOTC workers (10 percent).   
[Table 3 here] 
 Table 3 also lists the groups average tenure for each of the four reasons for 
separation.  Workers who reportedly separate for personal reasons stay on the job longer 
than those who separate for the other three reported reasons.  Fired for cause and no-show 
occur after the shortest tenure.  It is also noteworthy that the smallest percentage of 
separations (for both WOTC and non-WOTC workers) stems from reported employer 
action (fired for cause).  This suggests that the results below will not be tainted by the 
effects of incentives that WOTC provides to employers for retaining WOTC workers (see 
Katz 1998).  Such incentives often specify a minimum duration of retraining efforts and 
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make that duration a condition of the employment subsidy.  In addition, the distribution 
of workers across length of tenure does not show any unusual clumping of separations 
around key thresholds (e.g., 90 days); see figure 1). 
Determinants of Quit Behavior 
 A simple job search model of voluntary separation behavior (hereafter described 
as quit behavior) shows that a person's current wage and a person's alternative income 
(e.g., as might be determined by a state's welfare policies) are important determinants of 
the decision to quit one's current job.10  Human capital theory suggests that job tenure is 
also important in determining job separations (see Becker 1975; Hotchkiss 2002).  An 
employee’s specific human capital is likely to increase with the length of the individuals 
tenure.  This increase in capital also raises the employee’s productivity. Since the 
employer in this study includes the value of specific human capital in compensation, and 
other potential employers may not, it is in the worker's interest to not quit the current job. 
 The theory of job-matching also predicts that tenure on the job is related to 
separation behavior, but for different reasons than those covered above (Jovanovic 1979a, 
1979b). According to job-matching theory, when the worker begins the job, neither the 
firm nor the worker knows the quality of the job match.  Hence, the probability is low 
that the worker will quit in the initial stages of employment.    As tenure in the job 
increases, the worker collects information about the job match, (e.g., on working 
                                                
10 The formal model is available upon request. The predictions of the theoretical model 
are consistent with empirical evidence on the determinants of quit behavior (see, Weiss 
1984, Blau and Kahn 1981, Berg et al. 1992, Meitzen 1986, Sicherman 1996, Bartel 
1982). 
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conditions).11  Poor matches often prompt the worker to quit; good matches likely induce 
the worker to remain in the position.  Thus, this theory predicts that the hazard of job 
separation is initially quite low, but that it increases as bad matches result in separation. 
As the length of tenure increases, the hazard decreases because the matches that continue 
are primarily good ones (Chapman and Southwick 1991; Lane and Parkin 1998).   
 Although the amount of specific human capital among WOTC workers is not 
likely to differ dramatically from that among non-WOTC workers (because jobs held by 
both groups are entry-level positions), job separation behavior may differ due to 
differential job-matching. Workers in the WOTC group may have limited past 
employment experiences, which may also create pressure to accept jobs quickly.  These 
factors may result in job matches that are inferior to those of non-WOTC workers.  
However, WOTC workers may have better job matches than those of non-WOTC hires, 
as availability of alternatives (Jovanovic 1979a).  Those limitations may also prompt 
WOTC workers to persist in bad matches. 
Empirical Analysis 
 Time to Job Separation: A Survival Analysis  
 To explicitly address the issue of job duration or tenure, an accelerated failure-
time (AFT) model is estimated using the entire sample. Separate models also are 
estimated by WOTC status.  The AFT model expresses the natural logarithm of the 
survival time (job tenure in days, in this case) as a linear model of covariates (see Kiefer 
1988): 
 ' ' '0 1 2 3 4 1ln( )i i i i i itenure X Y Z WOTC uα α α α α= + + + + + ,, (1)  
                                                
11 Job-match theory predicts that good matches will receive higher wages and poor 
matches lower wages.  However, information about job-match quality cannot be inferred 
from wages in the current analysis, as this job is covered by a union contract.   
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where α is the vector of coefficients to be estimated and 
€ 
u1i  is the error term. The 
variables included in the model are based on data availability and the theoretical 
considerations discussed earlier.  The vector Xi consists of a set of personal 
characteristics; the vector Yi consists of a set of job-related characteristics; the vector Zi 
contains geographic variables, including state-specific fixed effects; the dummy variable 
indicating WOTC status is represented by the variable WOTCi.  The variable WOTCi 
equals 1 if the individual is identified as qualifying the firm for a WOTC subsidy.  All 
variables contained in X, Y, and Z are described in table 1. 
 Equation (1) can be estimated via maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) by 
assuming a distribution for
€ 
u1i .  The preferred AFT model, estimated here, assumes that 
€ 
u1i  follows the generalized gamma distribution. That is, the model was estimated 
assuming log-normal, log-logistic, Weibull, and exponential distributions.  The 
generalized gamma was selected as the preferred model based on the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC).  The conclusions do not change when different distributional 
assumptions are made. The hazard function for the generalized gamma distribution is 
very flexible; nested within it are the log-normal, Weibull, and exponential models, 
depending on the value of parameters of the generalized gamma survival function.12  
Table 4 presents three sets of estimated coefficients: the first set includes estimates for 
the full sample, the second includes those for non-WOTC workers; and the third includes 
those for WOTC workers.  In the AFT specification, time is scaled by a factor 
)exp( βiΩ− , where iΩ  is the vector of covariates and β  are coefficients. Thus, a 
positive coefficient implies that predicted tenure is extended. 
                                                
12 All estimations in this article are obtained using version 8.0 of the statistical software 
package STATA. 
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[Table 4 here] 
 The first point of interest in the results is that predicted median tenure of WOTC 
workers is higher by about 6 days than that of the full sample (see column 1).  A one 
dollar increase in the wage and being a student also are estimated to increase median 
tenure by 69 days and 24 days, respectively.13  All racial and ethnic groups except Native 
Americans have tenures that are statistically significantly different than the reference ? 
excluded group (blacks).  The statistically significantly longer tenure among Hispanics (4 
days) shows up only in the results for the full sample.  Compared to tenures of the 
reference group, those among Asians are shorter (from 26 to 36 fewer days, depending on 
the subsample); tenure is also shorter among white non-WOTC workers (3 fewer days) 
than it is among ___.  White WOTC hires exhibit about 17 days longer tenure.  Being 
female, older and better-educated have the estimated effect of reducing tenure, as does 
working the night shift.     
 Based on the estimated coefficients, and using the median individual 
characteristics of WOTC and non-WOTC employees, the predicted median tenure is 102 
days for WOTC workers and 84 days for non-WOTC workers.  Thus, the median tenure 
for a WOTC worker is 18 days longer than that for a non-WOTC worker. 
 A number of results stand out among the estimated marginal effects for WOTC 
and non-WOTC workers.  Workers in the WOTC group appear to be more sensitive than 
                                                
13 The model was reestimated without the wage regressor to get a sense of the model's 
stability. The coefficients on the remaining regressors are essentially unchanged, except 
that not controlling for the wage, previous experience lengthens the tenure of a WOTC 
worker and tenure is shorter among white WOTC workers.  In addition, the positive 
influence of previous experience on tenure among non-WOTC hires becomes 
significantly different from zero.  The correlation between a worker's wage and previous 
experience is not unexpected, especially in the presence of union representation. 
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their non-WOTC counterparts to changes in the wage rate.14  This result suggests that the 
ability to raise wages provides firms with a powerful tool to lower quits among WOTC 
workers.  If the wage is too low, WOTC workers may see welfare or disability (SSI) 
income as viable alternatives.  By contrast, non-WOTC workers may not consider such 
options.  This observation is consistent with the results of Johnson and Corcoran (2003), 
who find lower turnover among welfare recipients receiving higher wages and among 
those employed in higher-skilled jobs. 
 In addition, among WOTC workers, there is no statistically significant relation 
between having post-high school education and the predicted time to separation.  Among 
non-WOTC workers, having post-high school education speeds up the time to separation.  
Further, the usual negative relationship between firm size (proxied here by total work 
volume of the workers’ establishment) and turnover (see Even and Macpherson 1996) 
shows up to a statistically significant degree, among non-WOTC workers, but the relation 
is not statistically significant among WOTC workers. 
 The magnitude of several of the marginal effects is larger for WOTC hires; in 
terms of the student variable, the difference possibly indicates that WOTC workers place 
more value than their non-WOTC counterparts on the ability to combine school and 
work; workers in the WOTC group may hope that such an ability will provide them with 
a better (economic) future.  Among WOTC workers, the statistically, significantly, 
female may suggest that female WOTC workers have greater difficulty in resolving 
personal issues (e.g., child care) than male WOTC workers do.  This supposition is 
explored in the next section. 
                                                
14 The magnitude of the coefficient and marginal effect, however, should make one wary 
about predicting effects out of the range of variable scores in the sample. 
- 16 - 
 Separation Types and Job Assistance Programs: A Competing Risks Analysis  
 An individual may separate from his or her employer for a variety of reasons, and 
no-show separations are most likely very different from separations in which the worker 
moves to a different job.  Indeed, Anne Beeson Royalty (1998) finds that not all types of 
turnover are created equal.  Important differences in behavior across demographic groups 
obscure important separation patterns when the separation types are aggregated.  For this 
reason, a competing risks model is estimated to determine whether WOTC workers 
separate from their jobs for reasons that are systematically different from those that 
prompt separation among non-WOTC workers.  Identifying systematic differences across 
types of separation will help guide policy makers in targeting those differences. 
 If one takes covariates into account and follows Cox and Oakes (1984), the log 
likelihood function for the independent competing risks model is:15 
 ln log ( ; ) *log ( ; )r i i ri r i i
r i r i
L S t d h tγ γ= +∑∑ ∑∑   (2)  
where r is the reason for separation; Sr is the survivor function for the rth separation 
reason estimated in AFT metric; hr is the hazard function for the rth separation reason 
estimated in AFT metric; ti represents observed tenure for the ith employee; dri is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if individual i separates for reason r (0 otherwise); and γi 
represents all of the explanatory variables included in equation (1). The equation also 
includes four indicators of whether specific job assistance programs were available at the 
worker's establishment.  Assuming independence amounts to assuming a lack of 
                                                
15 Where an individual is labeled as failing if rri ; otherwise, the individual is censored.  
(see Cox and Oakes 1984). 
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correlation among unobservables that contribute to each type of separation.16  The results 
of the competing risks model are presented separately.  
 The firm in this study operates over 30 job assistance programs throughout the 
United States. Most of the firm’s sites are located in major cities.17  Participation in these 
programs is not restricted to WOTC workers, nor are the programs offered in all locations 
that hire WOTC-qualifying workers.  The main program category types include:  
mentoring programs, in which a more senior employee serves as a guide for the new hire; 
school programs, in which high school or college classes are offered on-site, or at a 
reduced cost; work training programs, in which basic job skill classes are available from 
local agencies; and transportation programs, which provide employees with subsidized or 
free transportation to work. 18 
[Table 5 here] 
 As suggested by the predicted median tenure row in table 5, WOTC and non-
WOTC workers are most similar in their time until separations that occur for personal 
reasons.  Although personal issues lead to the fastest separations (i.e., shortest tenure), 
there is no evidence that personal issues (child care) interfere more with the performance 
                                                
16 Söderberg and Lyhagen (1999) propose an information matrix test for dependence 
between risks.  However, since only tenurei min(tenureri) and di are observed, one cannot 
test the assumption of independence between the tenure outcomes (see Lawless 1982, 
483).  The assumption of independence is commonly used in research; see Blank (1989), 
Blank and Ruggles (1994); Addison and Portugal (2004).   
17 About 28 percent of the workers in this study have a work program available to them.  
18 A natural question arises as to whether an establishment is more likely to offer job 
assistance programs if it is experiencing a problem with employee turnover.  If this is the 
case, there would be unobserved correlation between the propensity of an establishment 
to offer a program and worker tenure.  Analyses suggest that there is very weak 
correlation between other establishment characteristics and the propensity to offer any of 
the programs.  Statistically speaking, this result suggests that any attempts to correct for 
selectivity by creating an instrument for an establishment offering a program could not be 
supported. 
- 18 - 
of WOTC workers that with that of non-WOTC workers; WOTC workers separate for 
personal reasons only 2 days earlier than non-WOTC workers do.19 
 The table shows that WOTC workers are estimated to separate less quickly for 
professional reasons than non-WOTC workers do (by 46 days).  This suggests that it may 
take a WOTC worker longer to find alternative job prospects.20  However, among 
workers who were fired for cause, separations are estimated to occur more quickly for 
WOTC workers than for non-WOTC workers (by 187 days).  It is important to note that 
this is a relatively rare reason for separation among both WOTC and non-WOTC 
workers.  No-show separations also are estimated to occur more quickly among WOTC 
workers than among their WOTC counterparts.  Results also suggest that among WOTC 
workers, no-show separations occur more quickly than separations for professional 
reasons. By contrast, non-WOTC workers separate more quickly for professional reasons 
than they do for failure to show up for work.   These results are generally consistent 
findings in studies of job separation among welfare hires (Berg et al. 1992; Holzer et al. 
2004). 
 The results again suggest that WOTC workers are more sensitive to changes in 
the wage rate than are non-WOTC workers.  The wage also seems to have its strongest 
effect on the time to separation for being fired for cause; for an employee, the cost of 
shirking theoretically rises with increases in wages.  Having post-high school education 
shortens the time until separation for professional reasons. It lengthens the time until 
                                                
19 These findings are consistent with those of Wagner and Herr (2003, 7) who report that 
"work identity" is more important than actual barriers (e.g., child care transportation) in 
determining the length of a (?) work experience. 
20 The quality of postseparation outcomes is beyond the scope of this article, but some 
initial evidence on this question can be found in a working paper by Gunderson and 
Hotchkiss (2006). 
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separation due to terminations for cause (for all workers) and to no-show separations 
(among non-WOTC workers).   
 Among both WOTC and non-WOTC workers, being a student shortens the 
predicted time until separations due to personal issues and no-show, may interfere with 
the student’s ability to work.  Compared to make workers in the non-WOTC group, their 
female counterparts are estimated to have shorter times to separation for all four reasons.  
Among WOTC workers, women are estimated to separate most quickly for personal 
reasons. This result helps to pinpoint the source of the shorter, overall, tenure among 
female WOTC workers. 
 Across WOTC status, Hispanic, Asian, and white workers are estimated to 
separate less quickly than black workers for being fired for cause and less quickly for 
failure to show up for work.  Asian workers are estimated to separate more quickly for 
personal issues than black workers do.  In addition, relative to the evening shift (5-8 
p.m.), workers on all other shifts appear to separate more quickly due to being fired for 
cause and not showing up (although the difference is sometimes not statistically 
significant).  This may suggest that the evening shift is the most desirable.  Among 
workers fired for cause, those who worked on the early morning shift are estimated to 
separate.  This suggests that sleep issues may make errors common on the early shift. 
 Previous employment experience with the firm is estimated to have a mostly 
negative effect on tenure (especially for being fired) suggests that workers with previous 
experience may take the job for granted and be more likely to shirk responsibilities.  It 
may also indicate that more is expected of re-hires than of new employees; such 
expectations may increase separations for cause among re-hires.  Results suggest that 
higher unemployment rates lengthen time to separation for all studied reasons, especially 
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for being fired for cause.  Weak labor markets may discourage shirking behavior that 
could force an employee to look for another job.  Weak labor markets may also make it 
more difficult to find better, alternative employment, lengthening the time to separation 
for professional reasons.  Since these unemployment rates correspond to the date of hire, 
the longer time to being fired, or no-show, may mean that the weaker labor market 
allowed the firm to hire reliable workers at the time. 
 Although there are varying degrees of statistical significance and direction of 
effect, the results pertaining to the effect of job assistance program availability may offer 
specific policy suggestions for reducing specific types of separation.  Among non-WOTC 
workers, availability of a mentoring program is estimated to increase tenure among 
workers who are fired for cause and who separate for personal issues. To the extent that a 
mentoring program can improve a worker's "employment identity," these results are 
consistent with those of Suzanne Wagner and Toby Herr (2003 -7), but they suggest that 
identity apparently only influences behavior (significantly) among non-WOTC workers.    
Transportation programs are estimated to increase the time to separation among all 
workers fired for cause, but to reduce time to separation for professional reasons among 
non-WOTC hires.  Among non-WOTC workers, school program availability seems to 
lengthen time to separation, regardless of the reason for separation.  School programs 
seem to lengthen the tenures of WOTC workers who separate for professional reasons.  
Availability of a work training program is estimated to reduce time to separation for all 
reasons, although the reductions are not always statistically significant among WOTC 
hires.  Perhaps workers complete training programs and take the new skills on to different 
jobs (i.e., separating for professional reasons).  It may also be that the firm expects 
increased performance from those who complete training and perhaps the performance 
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expectations are higher for some programs; the training may thus make employees more 
susceptible to being fired for cause. 
Summary and Conclusions 
 This article focuses on the post hiring behavior of the WOTC worker and how it 
compares to the behavior of the non-WOTC worker.  The results confirm some previous 
findings and provide new insight into the stability of difficult-to-employ workers.  In 
particular, the results of a survival analysis indicate that WOTC workers stay on the job 
longer than non-WOTC workers.  The average difference between the groups may seem 
relatively small (18 days), but it nevertheless dispels the idea that WOTC workers are 
uniquely unstable employees.  
 Additionally, the tenures of WOTC workers are found to be more sensitive to the 
wage rate than those of non-WOTC workers. This suggests that high wages may be an 
effective tool for increasing the tenures of WOTC workers; states may wish to consider 
supplementing the wages of WOTC workers directly, instead of providing tax credits to 
the firms that hire them.  It also appears that the separation behavior of WOTC workers is 
sensitive to the shift worked.  In both groups (WOTC and non-WOTC workers) those 
fired for cause and those fired for failure to show up have shorter tenures if they work 
any but the evening shift. This finding suggests that firms may wish to consider shift 
assignments in developing strategies to retain workers who are particularly vulnerable to 
for-cause and no-show separations.  
 The availability of a mentoring program seems to be of particularly importance 
for lengthening the tenures of non-WOTC workers, But the association only rises to 
statistical significance when predicting the tenures of those who are fired for cause or 
who leave for personal reasons.  Work-training programs seem to reduce reasons for 
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separation and tenures among all workers, although the result is most statistically 
significant among non-WOTC hires; however, the availability of training programs 
reduces the tenures of WOTC (no-show workers to a statistically, significant degree.  The 
results suggest that, if the only goal is to reduce turnover, these types of programs are not 
a good idea.   
Alternatively, the availability of a transportation assistance program lengthens the 
estimated tenures of WOTC and non-WOTC workers fired for cause.  Because 
absenteeism is reported to be the most common reason for separation, the availability of 
transportation assistance may be effective in reducing the frequency of this outcome.   
Among non-WOTC workers, the availability of school programs appears to 
positively affect tenure across all reasons of separation; access to these programs is also 
estimated to extend the tenures of WOTC workers who separate for professional reasons. 
School programs may not pay short- and long-term dividends. In the short term, such 
programs may reduce turnover.  In the long term, school programs may improve the job 
outcomes of low-skill workers by helping these workers to build general human capital.  
 The results of the competing risks analysis also indicate that those WOTC 
workers who separate for personal reasons do not have shorter tenures than their non-
WOTC counterparts. However, tenures are shorter among WOTC workers who are fired 
for cause, who fail to show up for work, and who leave for professional reasons.  
Although it may be important to provide for the child care and other personal concerns of 
WOTC–qualifying individuals in order to get them into a job, once these issues have 
been addressed (and the individual is employed), personal matters do not seem to affect a 
WOTC worker’s separation decision any more than they affect those of their non-WOTC 
counterparts.  However, WOTC workers who separate because they are fired for cause or 
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fail to show for work have shorter tenures than their non-WOTC counterparts.  As a 
consequence, efforts to reduce turnover among the hard-to-employ may find the greatest 
marginal return in focusing on job performance and work-readiness skills. 
 Although the separation behavior of WOTC workers at one firm may or may not 
be applicable to those of the population as a whole, this comparison of two very similar 
workers in a common work environment provides insight on a number of questions.  It 
suggests that (1)  WOTC workers are not any less stable (and in fact stay slightly longer 
on the job) than other low-skill, non-WOTC workers; (2) the wage level is the most 
important factor in determining the time to separation, and is an even stronger 
determinant for WOTC workers than for non-WOTC workers; (3) mentoring, schooling, 
and transportation assistance programs may be the most effective ways to extend tenures; 
and (4) the tenures of WOTC workers who leave for personal issues are not shorter than 
those of their non-WOTC counterparts, but tenures are shorter among WOTC workers 
fired for cause or for not showing up to work. Tenures among WOTC workers who 
separate for professional reasons are shorter than those among non-WOTC workers who 
leave for the same reason.   
 Given the fixed costs of hiring workers, it is understandable why employers 
would want to avoid hiring workers from a group that is likely to stop showing up for 
work sooner than those in another group.  It also may be the case that the subsidy offered 
to employ these hard-to-employ workers is not enough to offset that risk. This may be 
why the WOTC subsidy (and others before it) have such a small take-up rate (Hamersma 
2003, 2005).  However, the analyses in this article suggest that WOTC workers are more 
similar to other low-skill workers than they are different.  Findings also suggest that 
specific policies (e.g., higher wages, some types of job assistance programs) can improve 
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the retention of all low-skill workers. 
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Figure 1. Percent Frequency Distribution of Time to Separation. 
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Table 1:  List of Variable Descriptions 
Variable  Description 
WOTC 1 if WOTC workers; 0 otherwise 
 
Individual characteristics: 
 
Married 1 if individual’s marital status recorded as married; 0 otherwise  
(single,divorced is excluded group) 
 
Age Individual’s age as of June 1999 
 
Greater than high school 1 if individual has post-high school education; 0 otherwise 
 
Student 1 if individual is recorded as being a student; 0 otherwise 
 
Veteran or Handicapped 1 if individual is recorded as being a veteran or handicapped; 0 otherwise 
 
Female 1 if female; 0 otherwise 
 
Hispanic 1 if individual is of Hispanic race; 0 otherwise (excluded racial dummy variable is 
Black) 
 
Asian 1 if individual is of Asian race; 0 otherwise 
 
Native American 1 if individual is of Native American race; 0 otherwise 
 
White 1 if individual is white; 0 otherwise 
 
Job haracteristics: 
 
 
Wage rate Hourly wage rate 
 
Previous employment with this 
firm 
 
1 if individual recorded as working at company before; 0 otherwise 
 
Early morning shift 1 if individual works early morning shift (approx. 6 a.m. - 9 a.m.); 0 otherwise  
(Evening-approx. 5 p.m. –8 p.m. is excluded shift)  
 
Night shift 1 if individual works night shift (approx. 10 p.m. – 1 a.m.); 0 otherwise 
 
Day shift 1 if individual works day shift (approx. 11 a.m. – 2 p.m.); 0 otherwise 
 
Total work volume volume of work (firm size) at location individual works, in 1,000’s  
(monthly number based on month the individual started working) 
 
Geographic-variables: 
 
Unemployment rate Unemployment rate for the state in the month of hire 
 
State fixed effect Expected to capture differences across states in economic health, welfare policy and 
generosity. 
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Job assistance programs: 
 
 
Mentoring program 1 if facility provides a mentoring program; 0 otherwise 
 
Transportation program 1 if facility provides free or reduced-cost transportation; 0 otherwise 
 
Work training program 1 if facility provides work-related skills training; 0 otherwise 
 
School program 1 if facility provides high school or college classes on-site or at a reduced cost; 0 
otherwise 
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Table 2:  Means of Selected Variables, by Censoring and Welfare Status 
 
 Not Censored (Separate = 1) Censored (Separate = 0) 
Variable Non-WOTC 
Workers 
WOTC 
Workers 
Non- WOTC 
Workers 
WOTC  
Workers 
Age 25 (7.8) 
[16, 65] 
 
24 (6.6) 
[17, 53] 
25 (8.4) 
[16, 65] 
24 (7.3) 
[16, 58] 
Tenure (days) 46.9 (52.7) 
[1, 503] 
 
45.9 (53.9) 
[1, 465] 
217.6 (160.2) 
[3, 729] 
212.4 (145.7) 
[4, 728] 
Education (years) 12.9 (1.3) 
[12, 18] 
 
12.7 (1.0) 
[12, 18] 
12.9 (1.2) 
[12, 18] 
12.7 (1.0) 
[12,17] 
Hourly wage rate $8.51 (0.13) 
[8.00, 16.19] 
 
$8.50 (0.04) 
[8.50, 9.00] 
$8.58 (0.47) 
[8.00, 21.42] 
$8.54 (0.23) 
[8.50, 13.94] 
Veteran or handicapped (%) 9 
 
4 7 4 
Student (%) 20 
 
22 34 33 
Female % 19 
 
46 20 44 
White % 36 
 
14 36 13 
Black % 50 
 
72  47 68 
No. of  observations 45,184 2,877 28,423 2,109 
Note:  WOTC workers = …; Non-WOTC Workers = … Standard deviation is in 
parentheses; minimums and maximums are in brackets 
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Table 3:  Reasons for Separating 
 
 Non-WOTC 
Workers 
WOTC Workers 
Personal issues:   
     No. of Observations (%) 16,478 (36%) 1,006 (35%) 
     Average tenure 
Minimum and Maximum 
 
 
51.5 (55.5) 
[1, 495] 
52.2 (59.0) 
[1, 442] 
Professional reasons:   
     No. of observations (%) 14,612 (32%) 691 (24%) 
     Average tenure 
Minimum and Maximum 
 
47.1 (54.7) 
[1, 503] 
44.5 (57.7) 
[1, 465] 
Fired for cause:   
     No. of observations (%) 4,552 (10%) 512 (18%) 
     Average tenure 
Minimum and Maximum 
 
41.9 (43.2) 
[1, 502] 
38.16 (35.7) 
[1, 433] 
No-show:   
     No. of observations (%) 9,542 (21%) 668 (23%) 
     Average tenure 
Minimum and Maximum 
 
41.2 (47.4) 
[1, 486] 
43.7 (52.3) 
[1, 457] 
 
No. of observations – total 
 
45,184  
 
2,877 
Note: For tenure, standard deviation is in parentheses. minimums and maximums are in 
brackets.  WOTC workers = __; non-WOTC workers = __. 
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Table 4:  Coefficients and Marginal Effects from Survival Model: Time to Separation 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Full Sample 
 
Non-WOTC 
Workers 
 
WOTC 
Workers 
Wage rate 0.815* 
 (0.024) 
[69.31] 
0.806*  
(0.025) 
[67.90] 
7.696*  
(0.385) 
[782.31] 
 
Age -0.077*  
(0.006) 
[-6.54] 
-0.079*  
(0.006) 
[-6.64] 
-0.048^  
(0.028) 
[-4.89] 
 
Age squared 0.001*  
(0.000) 
[0.10] 
0.001*  
(0.000) 
[0.10] 
0.001^ 
(0.000) 
[0.08] 
 
Previous employment with 
 this firm 
0.057  
(0.049) 
[4.96] 
0.071  
(0.050) 
[6.19] 
-0.274  
(0.222) 
[-24.47] 
 
Greater than high school      
education 
-0.035+  
(0.014) 
[-2.99] 
-0.038*  
(0.014) 
[-3.19] 
0.010  
(0.055) 
[1.02] 
 
Student 0.297*  
(0.017) 
[24.27] 
0.295*  
(0.018) 
[23.98] 
0.367*  
(0.064) 
[40.92] 
 
Veteran handicapped -0.044^ 
(0.025) 
[-3.69] 
-0.041  
(0.026) 
[-3.42] 
-0.168  
(0.131) 
[-15.85] 
 
Female -0.115*  
(0.017) 
[-9.50] 
-0.110*  
(0.018) 
[-8.96] 
-0.199*  
(0.058) 
[-20.05] 
 
Hispanic 0.046+  
(0.024) 
[4.02] 
0.038  
(0.024) 
[3.24] 
0.122 
(0.093) 
[13.03] 
 
Asian -0.367* 
(0.047) 
[-23.33] 
-0.358*  
(0.048) 
[-25.58] 
-0.445+ 
(0.212) 
[-36.79] 
 
Native American -0.043   
(0.074) 
[-3.56] 
 
 
-0.061  
(0.077) 
[-4.99] 
0.203  
(0.273) 
[22.85] 
 
White -0.031^  -0.038+  0.154^ 
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(0.016) 
[-2.62] 
(0.016) 
[-3.16] 
(0.081) 
[16.63] 
 
Early morning shift 0.025  
(0.033) 
[2.11] 
0.024 
(0.035) 
[2.06] 
0.080 
(0.115) 
[8.44] 
 
Night shift -0.093*  
(0.016) 
[-7.78]  
-0.097*  
(0.016) 
[-8.05]  
-0.040  
(0.066) 
[-4.01]  
 
Day shift -0.021   
(0.021) 
[-1.75] 
-0.030   
(0.022) 
[-2.52] 
0.094  
(0.075) 
[9.83] 
 
Total work volume 1.2x10-5*  
(0.000) 
[0.001] 
1.5x10-5*  
(0.000) 
[0.00] 
1.0x10-6   
(0.000) 
[0.000] 
 
Married -0.012 
(0.020) 
[-0.98] 
-0.013 
(0.020) 
[-1.13] 
0.091 
(0.096) 
[9.65] 
 
WOTC 0.064+  
(0.028) 
[5.60] 
-- -- 
 
 
 
Unemployment rate -0.041* 
(0.010) 
[-3.49] 
-0.046*  
(0.010) 
[-3.91] 
0.028  
(0.042) 
[2.85] 
 
Constant -2.264*  
(0.227) 
-2.02*  
(0.233) 
-62.302 *  
(3.306) 
 
Predicted median tenure (days): 
     Females only 
      Blacks only 
85 84 
75 
78 
102 
88 
89 
    
Log-likelihood -117974 -110742 -7078 
 
No. of observations 78,593 73,607 4,986 
Notes: All estimations include state fixed-effects.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Marginal 
effects are in brackets; they are evaluated at the median tenure.  Standard errors for the marginal 
effects are available from the authors, but indicated levels of significance match those of the 
parameter coefficients. * indicates significant at the 99% level; + indicates significant at the 95% 
level; ^ indicates significant at the 90% level.  WOTC = __;WOTC workers = __; non-WOTC 
workers = __. 
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Table 5:  Coefficients and Marginal Effects from Competing Risks Model: Separation Type 
 
 Non-WOTC Workers WOTC Workers 
Variable  
Personal 
 
Professional 
Fired for 
Cause 
 
No-Show 
 
Personal 
 
Professional 
Fired for 
Cause 
 
No-Show 
Wage rate 0.792* 
(0.082) 
[64.78] 
0.607* 
(0.077) 
[58.34] 
0.698* 
(0.159)  
 [256.94]  
 
0.658* 
(0.112) 
[110.22] 
4.201* 
(0.679) 
[336.82] 
5.113* 
(1.051) 
[711.68] 
4.919* 
(1.470) 
[890.52] 
 
3.683* 
(0.876) 
[473.26] 
Age 0.029* 
(0.007) 
[2.39] 
-0.088* 
(0.008) 
[-8.44] 
-0.000 
(0.013) 
[-0.12] 
-0.092* 
(0.010) 
[-15.49] 
0.063 ^  
(0.033) 
[5.02] 
-0.066 
(0.045) 
[-9.20] 
0.011  
(0.045) 
[2.00] 
 
-0.045 
(0.045) 
[-5.82] 
Age squared -0.000* 
(0.000) 
[-0.04] 
0.001* 
(1.2x10-4) 
[0.11] 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
[-0.00] 
 
0.001* 
(0.000) 
[0.24] 
-0.001 ^  
(0.001) 
[-0.08] 
0.001  
(0.001) 
[0.14] 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
[-0.05] 
 
0.001 
(0.001) 
[0.11] 
Previous Employment 
with this firm 
-0.099 ^ 
(0.060) 
[-7.70] 
0.042  
(0.071) 
[4.13] 
-0.209 + 
(0.099) 
[-69.76] 
 
-0.077 
(0.086) 
[-12.37] 
-0.032  
(0.283) 
[-2.52] 
0.881 ^  
(0.498) 
[195.07] 
-0.481 
(0.320) 
[-69.48] 
 
-0.189 
(0.343) 
[-22.22] 
Greater than high 
school education 
-0.051*  
(0.015) 
[-4.19] 
-0.097* 
(0.018) 
[-9.30] 
0.219* 
(0.029) 
[81.50] 
 
0.135* 
(0.023) 
[22.82] 
0.020  
(0.060) 
[1.63] 
-0.090  
(0.083) 
[-12.36] 
0.244*  
(0.091) 
[45.42] 
 
-0.017 
(0.080) 
[-2.21] 
Student -0.312* 
(0.020) 
[-23.39] 
-0.015 
(0.025) 
[-1.39] 
-0.049 
(0.039) 
[-17.78] 
 
-0.175* 
(0.031) 
[-27.94] 
-0.227* 
(0.073) 
[-17.09] 
0.127  
(0.105) 
[18.30] 
-0.139 
(0.106) 
[-24.18] 
 
-0.198+ 
(0.098) 
[-24.05] 
Veteran or 
handicapped 
0.067 + 
(0.028) 
[5.67] 
-0.061 + 
(0.030) 
[-5.72] 
0.295* 
(0.058) 
[123.06] 
 
0.059 
(0.040) 
[10.22] 
-0.067  
(0.146) 
[-5.21] 
-0.693*  
(0.178) 
[-71.63] 
-0.049 
(0.235) 
[-8.66] 
 
0.371 
(0.234) 
[56.87] 
Female -0.218* 
(0.019) 
[-16.75] 
-0.040 ^ 
(0.023) 
[-3.76] 
-0.061 ^ 
(0.035) 
[-21.99] 
 
-0.065 + 
(0.029) 
[-10.69] 
-0.299*  
(0.064) 
[-23.85] 
0.004  
(0.088) 
[-0.51] 
0.010 
(0.091) 
[1.83] 
 
-0.130 
(0.084) 
[-16.61] 
Hispanic -0.064 + 
(0.027) 
[-5.08] 
-0.307* 
(0.031) 
[-26.23] 
0.379* 
(0.051) 
[162.98] 
 
0.009 
(0.041) 
[1.52] 
-0.130 
(0.103) 
[-9.94] 
-0.131 
(0.145) 
[-17.30] 
0.318 ^ 
(0.165) 
[65.42] 
 
-0.047 
(0.141) 
[-5.88] 
Asian -0.199* 
(0.048) 
[-14.80] 
-0.287* 
(0.059) 
[-24.13] 
0.496* 
(0.111) 
[233.74] 
 
-0.006 
(0.076) 
[-1.08] 
-0.643* 
(0.213) 
[-38.42] 
-0.342 
(0.307) 
[-40.55] 
1.757 + 
(0.878) 
[843.29] 
 
-0.841* 
(0.271) 
[-74.09] 
Native American 0.014  
(0.084) 
[1.18] 
-0.137  
(0.097) 
[-12.30] 
0.246  
(0.159) 
[102.55] 
 
0.015 
(0.118) 
[2.53] 
0.234  
(0.357) 
[21.14] 
-0.301 
(0.411) 
[-36.23] 
-0.549  
(0.381) 
[-76.83] 
 
0.017 
(0.387) 
[2.17] 
White -0.025 
(0.018) 
[-2.00] 
-0.294*  
(0.021) 
[-27.23] 
0.543* 
(0.035) 
[218.07] 
 
0.277* 
(0.027) 
[48.38] 
0.044  
(0.089) 
[3.54] 
-0.113  
(0.118) 
[-15.06] 
0.276 ^  
(0.145) 
[55.26] 
 
0.037 
(0.115) 
[4.82] 
Early morning shift 0.216* 
(0.041) 
[19.53] 
0.078 ^ 
(0.047) 
[7.81] 
-0.648* 
(0.060) 
[-180.79] 
 
-0.178* 
(0.059) 
[-27.50] 
0.475* 
(0.165) 
[47.36] 
0.286  
(0.210) 
[45.27] 
-0.677* 
(0.160) 
[-92.82] 
-0.585* 
(0.169) 
[-59.00] 
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Night shift 0.038 + 
(0.017) 
[3.13] 
-0.065* 
(0.020) 
[-6.20] 
-0.055 
(0.034) 
[-20.17] 
 
-0.328* 
(0.026) 
[-53.28] 
-0.018  
(0.072) 
[-1.46] 
0.049  
(0.101) 
[6.93] 
-0.132 
(0.115) 
[-23.38] 
-0.255* 
(0.097) 
[-31.62] 
Day shift 0.041 ^ 
(0.024) 
[3.38] 
-0.213* 
(0.027)  
[-19.00] 
-0.309* 
(0.042) 
[-102.16] 
 
-0.022 
(0.038) 
[-3.58] 
0.050  
(0.083) 
[4.04] 
-0.121  
(0.113) 
[-16.25] 
-0.326 *  
(0.115) 
[-54.28] 
 
0.038 
(0.115) 
[4.96] 
Total work volume -2.1x10-5* 
(2.8x10-6) 
[-0.00] 
6.2x10-8 
(3.2x10-6) 
[0.00] 
-2.4x10-5* 
(5.3x10-6) 
[-0.01] 
 
5.8x10-6 
(4.1x10-6) 
[0.00] 
2.5x10-5 +  
(1.2x10-5) 
[0.00] 
-2.7x10-5 
(1.7x10-5) 
[-0.00] 
-9.0x10-6 
(1.8x10-5) 
[-0.00] 
 
9.5x10-6 
(1.6x10-5) 
[0.00] 
 
Married -0.069* 
(0.022) 
[-5.55] 
-0.097* 
(0.024) 
[-9.01] 
0.209* 
(0.044) 
[82.19] 
 
0.041 
(0.032) 
[7.04] 
-0.097 
(0.106) 
[-7.50] 
0.016 
(0.142) 
[2.29] 
0.181 
(0.166) 
[35.34] 
 
0.030 
(0.141) 
[3.87] 
Unemployment rate 0.091* 
(0.011) 
[7.45] 
0.123* 
(0.014)  
[11.78] 
0.194* 
 (0.023) 
[71.29] 
 
0.262* 
(0.018) 
[43.89] 
0.081 ^ 
(0.046)  
[6.52] 
0.178* 
(0.065) 
[24.83] 
0.228* 
(0.079) 
[41.29] 
 
0.194* 
(0.066) 
[24.90] 
Mentoring program 0.302* 
(0.088) 
[28.75] 
0.080 
(0.107) 
[7.94] 
1.484* 
(0.209) 
[1227.96] 
 
0.135 
(0.114) 
[24.13] 
-1.654 + 
(0.826) 
[-65.40] 
-0.246 
(1.018) 
[-30.37] 
0.071 
(1.101) 
[13.28] 
0.564 
(0.713) 
[97.15] 
Transportation 
program 
0.021 
(0.070) 
[1.72] 
-0.221 + 
(0.090) 
[-19.43] 
0.514* 
(0.143) 
[235.77] 
 
0.152 
(0.106) 
[27.19] 
0.417 
(0.278) 
[40.28] 
-0.435 
(0.414) 
[-50.70] 
1.277 + 
(0.540) 
[426.97] 
0.140 
(0.341) 
[19.13] 
Work training 
program 
-0.247* 
(0.050) 
[-18.02] 
-0.236* 
(0.061) 
[-20.33] 
-0.508* 
(0.098) 
[-148.68] 
 
-0.436* 
(0.078) 
[-59.90] 
-0.010 
(0.187) 
[-0.83] 
-0.298 
(0.243) 
[-36.23] 
-0.264 
(0.320) 
[-42.49] 
-0.818* 
(0.239) 
[-73.98] 
School program 0.549* 
(0.064) 
[55.61] 
0.387* 
(0.075) 
[43.05] 
0.107 
(0.124) 
[40.99] 
 
0.489* 
(0.092) 
[99.05] 
-0.504 ^ 
(0.284) 
[-35.50] 
1.139* 
(0.383) 
[230.04] 
-0.369 
(0.402) 
[-60.56] 
0.154 
(0.361) 
[20.68] 
Constant -2.820* 
(0.705) 
0.754 
(0.669) 
-0.803  
(1.370) 
 
0.181 
(0.964) 
-32.689*  
(5.793) 
-38.671* 
(8.961) 
-37.912*  
(12.508) 
 
-26.814* 
(7.475) 
Log-likelihood -38525 -37637 -15742 
 
-29261 -2284 -1951 -1454 
 
-1849 
Predicted median 
tenure (days)  
82 
 
96 
 
368 
 
168 80 
 
139 
 
181 
 
128 
No. of observations 
failed  
16,478 14,612 4,552 9,542 1,006 691 512 668 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is log tenure.  All estimations include state fixed-effects.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Marginal effects are in brackets; they are evaluated at the median tenure.  Standard errors for the marginal effects are 
available from the authors, but indicated levels of significance match those of the parameter coefficients. * indicates 
significant at the 99% level; + indicates significant at the 95% level; ^ indicates significant at the 90% level.  WOTC workers 
= ___; non-WOTC workers = ___. 
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